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Abstract. We present our experience from implementing the public-key
cryptosystem of Gonza´lez, Boyd and Dawson. We discuss different com-
putational methods and compare their relative efficiency experimentally.
We also compare the efficiency of this cryptosystem with that of the
ElGamal cipher.
1 Introduction
Gonza´lez, Boyd and Dawson [5] presented the GBD public-key cryptosystem,
which operates in the multiplicative group Z∗p of integers modulo a large prime
p = 2rq0q1+1, with q0, q1 large primes. The GBD cryptosystem is semantically
secure based on the difficulty of the following subgroup membership problem:
given p, two elements g0, g1 of order q0 and q1, and an element x ∈ Z
∗
p decide if
x is of order qi for i = 0, 1. It appears that the best attacks to the GBD entail
factoring p− 1.
With regard to the efficiency, the more computationally expensive operations
of the GBD cryptosystem are as follows. The key generation algorithm must
produce a prime p of the aforementioned form. Encryption takes two fixed-
base exponentiations and requires the encoding of plaintext messages into the
subgroup of Z∗p of order n. Decryption takes two fixed-exponent exponentiations,
and the decoding of the result back into the plaintext space.
In this paper we discuss the important implementation issues regarding the
GBD cryptosystem. We identify relevant computational techniques and compare
their efficiency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the GBD cryptosystem. Key generation is dealt with in Section 3, where we
discuss efficient methods for prime generation. In Section 4 we address plaintext
message encoding and decoding. In Sections 5 and 6, we investigate efficient
exponentiation techniques for the encryption and decryption algorithms. The
GBD cryptosystem was implemented in C and run on a desktop PC (Pentium 4
2.80GHz, 496 RAM, running Windows XP). Experimental results are provided.
Tests were performed for both 1024 and 2048 bit specified modulus sizes.
2 The GBD cryptosystem
The GBD cryptosystem [5] is described by three component algorithms: key gen-
eration, encryption and decryption. Before we describe these algorithms, let us
first describe the notation and mathematical background used in the subsequent
discussion.
We first consider the multiplicative group Z∗p of integers modulo a prime p,
where p = 2n+1, n = q0q1 and q0, q1 are distinct primes of equal binary size. Z
∗
p
has a subgroup for each divisor of p−1. We denote Gi as the proper subgroup of
Z∗p of order i. Figure 1 shows the subgroup structure of Z
∗
p. In what follows, all
operations are assumed to be reduced modulo p except where otherwise noted.
Let x be an integer. Then |x| denotes the bit length of x.
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Fig. 1. Lattice of subgroups of Z∗p.
2.1 Key Generation G(1k)
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs a public key
and corresponding private key. The key generation proceeds as follows:
1. Generate the modulus p such that p = 2q0q1 + 1, where q0, q1 are
each random primes of binary size k.
2. Select two elements gi of order qi, for i = 0, 1.
3. Compute αi ≡ q1−i(q
−1
1−i mod qi).
4. Output the public key e = (p, g0, g1) and the private key d = (α0, α1).
2.2 Encryption E(e,m)
This algorithm takes as input a message m an element of Gn, and the public key
e as produced by the key generation algorithm. The following algorithm outputs
an encryption of the message.
1. Choose two integers ri uniformly at random in Zn for i = 0, 1.
2. Compute vi = g
ri
i , an element of Gqi for i = 0, 1.
3. Compute ci = mv1−i for i = 0, 1.
4. Output the ciphertext (c0, c1).
Figure 2 illustrates the encryption algorithm. In the diagram the coordinate
axes represent subgroup components Gq0 and Gq1 . The plane represents Gn.
Any element m ∈ Gn has unique projections m0 on Gq0 and m1 in Gq1 such
that m = m0m1. Since vi ∈ Gqi , it follows that the projection of ci in Gqi is mi.
It can be shown that the unique projection of any element y of Gn on Gqi is
given by
yi = y
αi ,
which allows us to decrypt an encrypted message, as shown below.
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Fig. 2. Encryption of m ∈ Gn.
2.3 Decryption D(d, c)
The decryption algorithm recovers the message m from the corresponding ci-
phertext c given the private key d = (α0, α1), as follows.
1. Compute mi = c
αi
i for i = 0, 1.
2. Calculate m = m0m1.
3. Output m.
3 Key Generation Issues
3.1 Prime Generation
The key generation algorithm requires that a prime p of the form p = 2q0q1 + 1
be produced, where q0 and q1 are primes of the same binary size. Generation of
a number of such a form requires that q0 and q1 be produced first, then these
primes be used to construct p.
A naive way to do this would be to generate two distinct random primes q0
and q1 of specified size until the result p = 2q0q1 + 1 is prime. This process is
highly inefficient since two primes must be generated for every primality test.
Instead, we can continue generating random primes and testing all combinations
of primes generated so far to obtain a prime of the form p = 2q0q1+1, as shown
in Algorithm A. For every x primes generated, x(x− 1)/2 possible p values can
be tested. Hence this algorithm is much faster than the naive approach.
Algorithm A
Input: t - size of the required prime
Output: prime of size in the interval [t-2,t]
Generate random prime q[0] of size (t-1)/2
i=0
repeat
i=i+1
repeat
generate q[i] of size (t-1)/2
until q[i] not equal to q[j] for all j < i
for j = 0 to i-1
p = 2q[i]q[j]+1
if p is prime
return p
end if
end for
until a prime has been returned
Note that it is desirable that the algorithm never produces a prime with
binary size exceeding the specified size t. If this restriction is not enforced, then
when applied in practice, wasted transmissions of information may occur. For
example, if the application requires that a 1025 bit prime be transmitted on a
1024 bit packetsize connection, the prime needs to be split into two 1024 bits
messages where the second contains only 1 bit of relevant info. Therefore we
generate qi of size (t− 1)/2 so that for all combinations of primes qi, the size of
p does not exceed t.
However, as is mentioned in [5], with a slight alteration to the form of the
prime we require for this cryptosystem, we can allow for further increase in the
efficiency of the prime generation step of the key generation algorithm. If we
choose the form of the modulus to be p = 2rq0q1 +1, where r is an integer with
known factorisation and r ¿ n, the encryption scheme will still work since p− 1
still generates subgroup Gn. Additionally, there exist more primes of this form
than of the original form and thus finding primes of this form will be faster. The
Key Generation algorithm now becomes:
1. Generate the modulus p such that p = 2rq0q1 + 1, where q0, q1 are
each random primes of binary size k, and r is an integer selected to
be much smaller than q0q1.
2. Select two elements gi of order qi, for i = 0, 1
3. Compute αi ≡ q1−i(q
−1
1−i mod qi)
4. Output the public key e = (p, g0, g1, r) and the private key d =
(α0, α1)
Note that r is included in the public key. We will see later that this value will
be needed in the encryption process for message encoding. Also, there is no use
in keeping it hidden since r ¿ n and hence can be easily factored out of p− 1.
The following algorithm generates a prime of this form.
Algorithm B
Input: t - size of the required prime
Output: prime of at least size t-2
Generate random prime q0 of size bt/2c
Repeat
Generate random prime q1 of size bt/2c
Until q1 not equal to q0
r=0
repeat
r = r+1
p= 2rq0q1 +1
until p is prime
return p,r
It can be seen that r is incremented until a prime is constructed. Although
this algorithm will be faster in that only two primes ever need to be generated,
this also means that the prime p produced will almost always be larger than
the specified size. It is not possible to put a bound on the size of the p for this
algorithm because it is not known what value r will reach before the prime p is
found. We would prefer to be guaranteed that the size of the prime p is bounded
by length t. This can be done by limiting the value that r can reach and choosing
primes q0 and q1 of a specific size such that the maximum value the resulting p
can take does not exceed the specified size t.
Algorithm C
Input: t - size of the required prime, n - limit of r
Output: prime of size in interval [t - |n|- 1, t ]
Generate random prime q[0] of size b(t− |n| − 1)/2c
i=0
repeat
i=i+1
repeat
generate random prime q[i] of size b(t− |n| − 1)/2c
until q[i] not equal to q[j] for all j < i
for j = 0 to i-1
r=0
repeat
r = r+1
p = 2rq[i]q[j] +1
if p is prime return p, r
until r = n
end for
until prime has been returned
Experimental results Each of the prime generation algorithms were timed for
40 test runs for t = 1024 and t = 2048. The results are presented in Tables 1 to 3.
The actual bit sizes of the final primes were recorded, as well as the number of
random primes generated for each test run. Note that in Algorithm B, the value
of r was recorded instead of the number of primes generated. The maximum
value for r allowed in Algorithm C was 7.
It should be noted that in the implementation of each of the Algorithms A,
B and C, random primes were generated using the algorithm specified by A.15.4
in [3].
3.2 Remaining Steps
Generation of the prime modulus p of the form p = 2rq0q1 + 1 is the most time
consuming step of the key generation algorithm. The algorithms used to produce
such a prime have already been discussed. Implementation of the remaining steps
of the algorithm will be discussed here.
After the prime has been generated, the elements g0 and g1 of order q0 and
q1 respectively must be chosen. To do this we must perform the following steps:
1. pick a g ∈R Gn by selecting x ∈R Zp and calculating g = x
2r mod p
t = 1024 bits t = 2048 bits
No. primes No. bits time(sec) No. primes No. bits time(sec)
Mean 30.625 1022.600 11.943 40.400 2046.625 164.433
Stdev 16.885 0.496 7.746 21.186 0.490 100.326
Min 10 1022 2.828 9 2046 22.218
Max 80 1023 37.843 80 2047 382.339
Table 1. Algorithm A timings
t = 1024 bits t = 2048 bits
r No. bits time(sec) r No. bits time(sec)
Mean 280.350 1032.175 3.206 600.925 2056.925 41.474
Stdev 282.772 1.615 2.191 597.165 2.117 32.095
Min 7 1027 0.891 4 2051 7.934
Max 1695 1036 13.882 2745 2060 149.805
Table 2. Algorithm B timings.
t = 1024 bits t = 2048 bits
No. primes No. bits time(sec) No. primes No. bits time(sec)
Mean 9.075 1022.525 5.502 13.675 2046.800 87.625
Stdev 4.817 0.933 3.230 6.981 0.911 53.396
Min 1 1020 1.328 3 2045 19.047
Max 19 1024 13.218 26 2048 196.310
Table 3. Algorithm C timings (n = 7).
1024 bit prime 2048 bit prime
Avg time (sec) 0.0616 0.44065
Table 4. Timings for the remaining steps of the key generation algorithm.
2. compute g0 = g
q1 mod p
3. compute g1 = g
q0 mod p
4. if g0 = 1 or g1 = 1 then go back to 1
Since n has only two prime factors q0 and q1, g will almost always be chosen
to have order n1. Thus, this step will almost always cost two exponentiations.
The third step of the key generation algorithm computes the secret keys
α0, α1. These calculations require two inversions and two multiplications. The
inversions can be performed using a modification of the binary extended gcd
algorithm (Algorithm 14.61 in [4]) for calculating multiplicative inverses. Since
both of the multiplications are single multiplications, they can be implemented
using the classical multiplication method. There is no speedup by using a method
such as montgomery multiplication when only a single multiplication is needed.
α0 = q1(q
−1
1
mod q0)
α1 = q0(q
−1
0
mod q1)
Experimental Results In Table 4, times are given for test runs of the Key
Generation algorithm. Since the section above focuses on the efficiency of the
prime generation step, the times in Table 4 show the running times of the remain-
ing steps of the Key Generation algorithm. ie. The total time for key generation
is the sum of the prime generation time and the figures in Table 4.
4 Message Encoding and Decoding
Let the plaintext message space be M = {1, ..., n−1}. The encryption algorithm
takes as input a message m′ ∈ Gn. A message m ∈ M must therefore be con-
verted to the subgroup Gn prior to encryption, and then back to M subsequent
to decryption in order to recover the original message m.
A message m ∈ M can be converted to an element m′ of the subgroup Gn
by calculating
m′ ≡ m2r mod p (1)
since for all elements x ∈ Gn,
xn ≡ 1 mod p
and
1 The only numbers which do not have order n are those elements a such that
gcd(a, n) 6= 1. This only applies to multiples of q0 and q1 and there are q0 + q1
such numbers out of q0q1 elements in Gn.
m′
n
≡ (m2r)n ≡ mp−1 ≡ 1 mod p
For the case where r = 1 (the prime p is of the form p = 2n + 1), encod-
ing a message is equivalent to squaring the message modulo p, and decoding a
message is the same as taking the square root of a message modulo p. There
exist algorithms of varying complexity to perform such an operation. For gen-
eral primes p, Algorithm 3.34 in [4], computes square roots with an expected
running time O((log p)4) bit operations. For p ≡ 3 mod 4, i.e. half of all primes,
Algorithm 3.36 in [4] has running time of O((log p)3). Table 5 shows encoding
and decoding times obtained experimentally using squaring for encoding and the
square root algorithm 3.36 in [4], for p = 2n+ 1 ≡ 3 mod 4.
1024 bit modulus 2048 bit modulus
Avg Encoding time (sec) 0.003 0.006
Avg Decoding time (sec) 0.056 0.431
Table 5. Encoding and decoding times using squaring (5 runs, p = 2n+1 ≡ 3 mod 4)
However, for the case when r > 1, the problem of message decoding becomes
more difficult. There is an absence of known algorithms to compute k-th roots
modulo p for small k with efficiency significantly better than that of exponenti-
ating to a random power, so we must look for an alternative method of message
encoding and decoding.
A possible solution is to use a method of encoding which adds suffixes of
random bits to the initial message until it is in Gn. Specifically, if a certain
number of bits m in the message space of bit size |n| − 1 are set aside, and a
message is chosen from this smaller (|n| −m − 1) bit message space, then it is
possible to add a suffix of size m bits to the message such that the constructed
message is in Gn. Therefore, the process of decoding the message after decryption
it is simply a matter of stripping the suffix from the message, an operation of
negligible expense.
When r = 1, Gn is the set of quadratic residues modulo p (denoted Qp).
That is, an element a is an element of Gn if an element x exists such that x
2 ≡ a
mod p. To test whether an element a is a quadratic residue, one can calculate
the Legendre Symbol which is defined as
(
a
p
)
=


0 if p|a;
1 if a ∈ Qp;
−1 if a /∈ Qp.
(2)
There is an efficient algorithm (Algorithm 2.149 in [4]) that calculates this
symbol with running time O((log p)2). Since half the elements in Z∗p are also
in Gn, on average two random suffixes must be generated and tested before a
message in Gn is found. Table 6 presents times measured when encoding is done
by padding the message and testing quadratic residuosity using Algorithm 2.149
in [4].
1024 bit modulus 2048 bit modulus
Avg Encoding time (sec) 0.003 0.094
Avg Decoding time (sec) negligible negligible
Table 6. Encoding and decoding times using padding (10 runs, p = 2n + 1, padding
bit-length m = 10 )
However, when r > 1, Gn is no longer the set of quadratic residues, but
rather the set of 2rth power residues. No efficient algorithm has been found for
checking whether a number is a kth power residue modulo p. A number can
be checked using a single exponentiation, but this is far too inefficient since on
average 2r exponentiations will need to be performed before an element of Gn
is found. Hence it is more difficult to check whether a number is an element of
Gn for r > 1 than r = 1.
5 Encryption
According to the encryption algorithm, encryption requires two exponentiations
and two multiplications. It is also important to note that the cost of encryption
must also include the cost of any operations used for message encoding.
The second step of the encryption algorithm as presented in section 2.2 can be
implemented using a number of techniques. We can implement this step using
montgomery exponentiation using a sliding window method (Algorithm 14.85
in [4]). Encryption times of such an implementation are given in Table 7.
However, it is possible to take advantage of the fact that every encryption us-
ing a given public key will use fixed bases, the gi values. There are techniques for
fixed base exponentiation which use this redundancy by precomputing powers
of the base during key generation. One such method is the fixed-base windowing
method described in 14.109 of [4]. Experimental times for the fixed-base win-
dowing method are given in Table 8. Notice that it is possible to reduce the
encryption times by approximately a factor of four depending on the selection
of the fixed base parameters. For both a 1024 and 2048 bit modulus, a radix of
32 offers the greatest increase in efficiency. We must note that, depending on the
application, it may not be feasible to store precomputed values. In lightweight
applications, there may be memory constraints which do not allow for methods
using stored precomputed values.
The third step of the algorithm involves two single multiplications which can
be computed using the classical multiplication method.
1024 bit modulus 2048 bit modulus
Avg time (sec) Avg time (sec)
Normal expn 0.0580 0.2240
Table 7. Encryption times (excluding message encoding) using Algorithm 14.85 in [4]
for 100 tests
t = 1024 bit modulus t = 2048 bit modulus
Radix Number of Precomp Avg Encryption Precomp Avg Encryption
b Precomps Time (secs) Time (secs) Time (secs) Time (secs)
4 256 0.481 0.018 1.795 0.070
8 170 0.334 0.015 1.254 0.059
16 128 0.264 0.014 1.876 0.052
32 102 0.220 0.013 0.826 0.051
64 85 0.190 0.015 0.720 0.056
128 73 0.170 0.019 0.646 0.071
256 64 0.156 0.028 0.590 0.108
Table 8. Encryption (excluding message encoding) using fixed-base pre-computations
(Algorithm 14.109 of [4]) for 100 tests and randomly selected exponents of 512 bits.
The expected number of multiplications is ( b−1
b
)dlogb 2
te+ b− 3.
6 Decryption
The decryption process outlined by the decryption algorithm stated earlier con-
sists of two exponentiations and a multiplication. However, there exist algorithms
that can perform these operations simultaneously at a significantly lower cost
than performing the separate operations.
One approach is to use algorithm 14.88 in [4]. This algorithm calculates
the product of k modular exponentiations ge0
0
ge1
1
...g
ek−1
k−1 simultaneously. For the
GBD decryption algorithm, the product of only two exponentiations is needed.
This result is achieved by first precomputing the value G = g0g1. Next a square-
and-multiply technique is performed as follows:
Let ei[j] be the j
th bit of the binary representation of ei and let n be the
maximum of the binary size of e0 and e1.
a = 1
for j = n-1 down to 0
a = a2
if e0[j] = e1[j] = 1 then
a = a ∗G mod p
else if e0[j] = 1 and e1[j] = 0 then
a = a ∗ g0 mod p
else if e0[j] = 0 and e1[j] = 1 then
a = a ∗ g1 mod p
end if
end for
We refer to this algorithm as the two-in-one exponentiation algorithm.
Another technique for calculating simultaneous multiple exponentiations is
the use of vector addition chains. Let us first discuss a simple addition chain
which is used to calculate a single exponentiation xn. An addition chain for a
number n is defined as a sequence of integers
a0 = 1, a1, ..at = n
such that
ai = aj + ak, for some k ≤ j < i, for all i = 1, 2, ..., t
A short addition chain for an exponent n gives a fast means of computing
gn. For all k = 1, 2, ..., t,
gak = gai ∗ gaj , where ai + aj = ak.
Hence, addition chain exponentiation requires exactly t multiplications.
A vector addition chain of k numbers is a generalisation of an addition chain,
where each element of the chain, vi, is a vector of k integers. We say that it has
dimension k. Vector addition chains of length t + 1 and dimension k have the
following properties:
– The first k vectors in the chain are the unit vectors such that vi has a 1
in position i and 0 in every other position. E.g. for a 3 dimensional vector
addition chain, v0 = [1, 0, 0], v1 = [0, 1, 0] and v2 = [0, 0, 1].
– For k ≤ s ≤ t , vs is the vector addition of vi and vj for some i, j < s
– The final vector vt is equal to the given k numbers.
Before we discuss the implementation of vector addition chain exponenti-
ation, we must also discuss addition sequences. An addition sequence for a
sequence of integers n0, n1, .., nk is an addition chain which contains each of
n0, n1, .., nk. Olivos [6] showed that finding good vector addition chains is equiv-
alent to finding good addition sequences.
A k-dimensional vector addition chain is a means of finding the product of k
exponentiations. Therefore, the decryption algorithm of the GBD cryptosystem
requires a precomputed two dimensional vector addition chain for α0, α1. We
have approached the problem of creating such a chain by first generating an
addition sequence for α0, α1 and then converting this sequence to a vector ad-
dition chain using a method demonstrated in [6]. In order to create an addition
sequence for α0, α1, we have used a technique Bos [1] calls the protosequence
algorithm.
Input:a - list of numbers for which to make an addition sequence
p = a
insert 1 into p
insert 2 into p
seq = 1,2
while max(p) > 2
f = max(p)
insert f into seq
for n in PROTOFUNCTION(p)
if n not in p
insert n into p
end if
end for
remove f from p
end while
return seq
The PROTOFUNCTION(p) function takes as input a list of numbers which are
used to derive the next number(s) to be added to the sequence. We will de-
note this input sequence as 1, 2, ...f2, f1, f . The PROTOFUNCTION(p) used in our
implementation is as follows:
Input:p - list of numbers
If the number f/f1 < 2
return (f − f1)
end if
If f is even
return f/2
end if
If f is odd
// difference of f and largest odd number smaller than f in p
x = max ( x : x ∈ p | x is odd and x < f )
return (f − x )
end if
Method of decryption 1024 bits 2048 bits
Separate expn (Alg 14.85, [4]) 0.118 0.885
Two-in-one expn (Alg 14.88, [4]) 0.082 0.612
Vector addition chain expn (Alg 14.104, [4]) 0.069 0.502
Vector addition chain generation 1.274 10.367
Table 9. Average decryption times for 100 tests.
The corresponding vector addition chain can be derived from the addition
sequence to provide a means of calculating the product of exponentiations.
Table 9 compares the decryption times measured using 1) two separate expo-
nentiations, 2) the two-in-one exponentiation algorithm, and 3) vector addition
chain exponentiation. We notice vector addition chains reduce the running time
by more than 40%. In the GBD algorithm, the generation of the chain would
usually be performed during key generation. Therefore, the time to generate the
chain must be included in the key generation time. For each element of the chain
a pair of indexes must be stored, indicating which elements are added together
to obtain this element. Thus the use of vector addition chain exponentiation
requires storage of 2t integers, where t is the length of the chain.
7 Efficiency comparisons with ElGamal
Gonzalez et al. [5] claim that the GBD cryptosystem efficiency is comparable
to that of the ElGamal [2] cryptosystem. To further investigate this claim, the
ElGamal cryptosystem was implemented and comparisons for timings of key gen-
eration, encryption and decryption are featured in Tables 10 and 11. Each of the
times were observed using implementations that did not utilise precomputations.
Where possible, similar operations in each of the cryptosystems were imple-
mented using the same algorithms. For example, the sliding window method was
used for all single exponentiations, Montgomery arithmetic was utilised where
appropriate and random prime numbers were generated using A.15.4 in [3].
The ElGamal cryptosystem has been implemented to achieve semantic se-
curity as demonstrated by Tsiounis and Yung [7] by choosing a prime of the
form p = 2q + 1, where q is also prime. Implementation using primes of the
form p = 2rq + 1 where 2 ≤ r ≤ 7 was also done in order to speed up the key
generation process. These two forms of the ElGamal modulus are analogous to
the two GBD modulus forms considered in section 3.1 (p = 2rq0q1 + 1 for r = 1
and 2 ≤ r ≤ 7). Table 10 shows the times for key generation using each of the
two prime forms for both the ElGamal and GBD implementations.
The encryption and decryption times for both the ElGamal and GBD cryp-
tosystems are presented in Table 11. Encoding and decoding times have not
been included since these operations are equivalent in both cryptosystems. El-
Gamal requires encoding the message to the subgroup Gq prior to encryption
and decoding to the message space after decryption. The subgroup Gq is the
set of 2rth power residues and hence encoding and decoding can be approached
using the same techniques used for GBD (see section 4). The random exponents
used in the encryption implementations were chosen to be 512 bits. The GBD
decryption times were observed using two-in-one exponentiation.
We notice that the key generation times for ElGamal are orders of magnitude
slower than for GBD. This is because the density of primes of the form p = 2rq+1
where q is prime is much less than the density primes of the form p = 2rn + 1
where n is composite. In terms of encryption times, it can be seen that ElGamal
t = 1024 bit t =2048 bit
Form 1 modulus Form 2 modulus Form 1 modulus Form 2 modulus
ElGamal 1408.95 189.1 29404.1238 4008.1647
GBD 12.005 5.564 164.874 88.066
Table 10. Comparisons for timings (in seconds) of ElGamal and GBD key generation
algorithms. Primes for ElGamal and GBD are of the form p = 2rq+1 and p = 2rq0q1+1
respectively. Form 1 refers to the case when r = 1.
t = 1024 bit t =2048 bit
Encryption Decryption Encryption Decryption
time (secs) time (secs) time (secs) time (secs)
ElGamal 0.057 0.058 0.214 0.458
GBD 0.058 0.082 0.224 0.612
Table 11. Comparisons for timings of ElGamal and GBD encryption and decryption
algorithms excluding message encoding and decoding.
and GBD are equally as efficient. The decryption times show that ElGamal
decryption runs in about 70% the time required for GBD decryption.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated different implementation options for the
GBD cryptosystem. We have proposed an algorithm for generating primes of
the form p = 2q0q1 +1, which are needed for key set-up. We have seen that fur-
ther efficiency improvements can be obtained if we allowed primes of the form
p = 2rq0q1 + 1 for small r. However, this impacts plaintext message encoding
negatively. Such a problem could be overcome if an efficient algorithm for de-
ciding k-adic residuosity were devised, where by efficient we mean significantly
better than modular exponentiation to a random exponent.
Using existing techniques, we have shown that the complexity of the exponen-
tiations required for both encryption and decryption can be reduced significantly
using fixed-base precomputations and vector addition chains. In the latter case,
further efficiency gains may be possible by finding shorter chains.
Finally we have shown that the efficiency of the GBD cryptosystem is com-
parable to ElGamal in terms of encryption and decryption speeds. For key gen-
eration, primes of the form required by the GBD cryptosystem are significantly
easier to find than for ElGamal when equal modulus sizes are considered and
a modulus is selected for ElGamal which, like the GBD cryptosystem, provides
semantic security.
An exciting opportunity for research entails implementing the GBD algo-
rithm in algebraic groups different from Z∗p. This could lead to a more efficient
public key cryptosystem for an equivalent level of security.
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